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Youth policy is a relatively young topic for International Relations. Nevertheless, it 
becomes more relevant at the European level. There is an evolution and growing 
quantity of youth related strategies, programmes, acts and policies both at the European 
and domestic levels. For Europe, the youth can be a resource to support cooperation, 
smart economy and sustainable development. This Master’s Thesis argues that the 
European youth dimension has particular impact on domestic youth policies. This thesis 
inquires how European integration appears in the youth policy, and discovers causal 
relations between European and domestic policy changes. The object of this research is 
youth policy, and the subject is its evolution and changes due to European integration. 
It is possible to look at the youth dimension through the lens of Europeanization theory, 
and its narrower type – EU-ization. This thesis traces Europeanization in two cases – 
Finland and Norway. Both cases, on the one hand, have similar features of belonging to 
the Nordic states. On the other hand, they have different experiences of European 
integration. Process tracing and analytical narratives are the tools used in this research.  
The empirical research conducted in the Thesis discovered interconnections between 
European and domestic youth policies: consequences of policy changes, parallels in 
youth policy agendas. However, in both cases domestic youth policies have specific 
priorities. European integration has had different impact in the case of Norway and in 
the case of Finland. These differences seem to be caused by Europeanization and, in 
Finland, by EU-ization. Despite the fact that the youth dimension is young and not on 
the top list of European policies, European states introduce changes at domestic levels. 
This research shows how Europeanization and EU-ization appear in youth policy. It 
means that in order to design a more effective European youth policy, policy makers 
should identify which common recommendations and strategies are relevant for each 
particular state. Further unification of youth policy standards at the European level may 
cause domestic changes which are not objectively required, and thus would appear only 
under the “goodness of fit” notion. Instead, it might be more efficient to diversify the 
youth policy agenda and leave more initiative for domestic youth policies. 
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Youth policy is not a very popular topic for International Relations research. At 
the same time, there is a growing interest towards the youth at European level. This is 
due to a changed perception of the youth as resource; while this perception has for a 
long time existed in the Nordic States, it has relatively recently become emerged in 
European discourse.  Consequently, this provokes ideas about investment in youth in 
order to support European cooperation, smart European economy and sustainable 
development. I am sure that European youth strategy and youth programmes should not 
focus only at cooperation and serve only an instrument of European integration. Instead, 
they should be effective and comprehensive, take into account diversity of European 
states and their domestic policies as well as different youth policy agendas. That is my 
statement why this research is topical. The first chapter discusses the background of my 
thesis in more details. It provides the reader with meaning of the term “youth”, gives a 
notion of modern European youth environment and challenges, and argues whether 
there is a European youth policy, or it is only a number of strategic initiatives. Besides, 
the first chapter offers an overview of Nordic youth agenda, essential for further 
empirical evaluations. 
The research questions can be thus formulated as “how European integration 
appears in the youth policy”, “are there causal relations between European and domestic 
policy changes?” and finally, “what are these causal relations for each of two cases?”. 
For the purposes of manageability, I took two cases – Finland and Norway. They, on the 
one hand, have similar features of belonging to the Nordic states, with dominating 
universalistic models of policy, demographical similarities. On the other hand, they 
have different experience of European integration. Finland has joined the EU, and 
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Norway is only a partner. The object of my research is youth policy and the subject of 
the research is its evolution and changes due to European integration.  
In order to conduct this research, I have chosen Europeanization as a 
framework of study. European political studies have witnessed a growing popularity of 
the Europeanization theory. It is a transition from studies of European integration at the 
European level and within its institutions to studies of effects on domestic policies. 
Applicability of this theory is wide, and in the second chapter, I present a literature 
analysis of Europeanization, existing approaches and debates about their applicability.  
As I have mentioned above, the empirical part for my research is performed by 
two cases. Case studies are widely spread in international relations academic literature. 
It is reasonable because of case study is reality-bended and has potential to operate with 
many variables. Process tracing and reconstructed narratives are the tools for identifying 
causal relations and answering my research questions. The third chapter of this thesis 
describes the methodological framework of my research. It applies to contemporary 
tendencies of international relations studies and combination of various methods for a 
more complex analysis.  
Finally, the empirical chapter includes the results of my analysis of primary 
sources. The sources are European youth dimension’s official documents, as well as 
domestic ones of Finland and Norway. The analysis predominantly traces “top-down” 
Europeanization, which is a limitation chosen to make the research manageable. The 
analysis compares reconstructed narratives of the European, Finnish and Norwegian 
youth dimension (accordingly, independent and two dependent variables). It also 
accounts time and sequence of events. Such an approach helps me to discover what 
effects of Europeanization are fare for each case: both in conceptualizing “youth” and in 




1. Is there a European Youth Policy? 
 
The question, which is also the name of this chapter, is not a rhetoric one, and at 
the same time, it has no true answer. Further, I will recall arguments for different points 
of view on European understanding of youth dimension. Besides, I will present youth 
policy approaches of member states. Finally, there will be overview of youth dimension 
in context of Nordic welfare states, which is closely tight with two cases of my research. 
 
1.1. Youth dimension in European policies 
 
1.1.1. Understanding ‘the youth’ 
 
Youth policy is a quite young field of study, the fact supported even by lack of 
consistency in conceptualizing youth. As an independent policy, youth policy is rarely 
seen in national states. Consequently, it is rare that we see Ministries of Youth, youth 
legislation, etc.. Among the EU member states, it is more often a part of some other 
social area (education, sports, social care, health care and others). My attention to youth 
policy is determined by a personal belief that the European youth strategy can work 
more effectively if it takes into account national and local youth problems and is more 
cautious in the standardization and formalization of national youth policies. On the 
other hand, there are obviously positive effects: transmitting of best practices, more 
opportunities (including resources and expertise) for the most challenged (economically 
and socially) states.   
According to a report on the Council of Europe national youth policy review, 
“most countries have dramatically expanded their youth policy in recent years, both in 
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conception and operation” (Williamson 2002, 36). This fact, together with new 
challenges offered by modern globalized and integrated world, requires further and 
updated youth researches. However, there is still no general concept of “youth”. It is 
defined through generation (age-related definitions), phase of life or social categories. 
European statistics shows that young people and children are almost 30% of European 
population (Eurostat). However defining youth I face a lack of consistency among 
countries. Age-related definition of “youth” is the most common; although it varies 
from country to country and the frames are extremely open. In some Nordic countries 
(f.i. Norway and Sweden) young people are not clearly distinguished from children 
(referring to policy). On the contrary, in Spain and Bulgaria a person of 30-35 years old 
can be still considered “youth”. The “traditional” age boundaries of youth – 15-24 years 
– are necessarily blurred and extended (Siurala, n.d., 9).  In order to avoid defining 
youth through age categories some researchers appeal to youth as a “social status” and 
meaning a period of material dependence (fully or partly) on the others (Tyyska 2005). 
Heterogeneity of the youth creates various understandings of this concept. It is 
reasonable to achieve a common definition of youth related concepts when speak about 
European youth dimension. This includes also clarifying the concepts when compare 
several countries. 
In the context of youth policy research it is interesting that scholars mark out 
four levels of youth research: individual, interaction, institutions and society. Renate 
Nestvogel offered to add a fifth level – “global system” (Hornstein, W. 2008, 45). 
National societal forms of interaction with young people include internships abroad, 
volunteer experiences, student and youth exchanges and trainings. All these are 
essential to enter the globalized market, and these experiences strengthen desire of 
young people for autonomy (which according to the above stated is lower in the modern 
world). Thus, youth relations at the regional and global level should be a subject of 
8 
 
research. This Master Thesis aims to go beyond national society level; similarly, it aims 
to avoid comparing the countries with each other only. The objective is to investigate an 
interaction at European-EU-domestic levels in terms of youth policy. 
 
1.1.2. Youth Policy or something different? 
 
As I have written, European youth researches came from reviews of national 
youth policies. In 2001 “European Commission White Paper: A New Impetus for 
European Youth” was published. It is also my starting point. Then another international 
organization for European integration – the Council of Europe (COE) – published its 
own standards for youth policies development and implementation (Williamson 2002, 
12). It composes a basis of theoretical and empirical data about youth policy of the EU 
and other European states, offers standards for Europe regarding youth policy. There is 
already the term ‘youth policy’, however only with regard of domestic youth policies of 
states.  
Meanwhile there is no common European youth policy itself as there is. Neither 
at the EU level (unlike, for example, CFSP or Migration or Environmental Policy), not 
at regional European level. In the field of youth relations Europe rather offers a general 
overview of national policies, distributes best practices and plays an advisory role. In 
COE international reviews on national youth policies the following goals are 
mentioned: to advise on national youth policy and to identify components of youth 
policy and form an approach to it across Europe (ibid.). Answering the lack of holistic 
approach COE recommendations help to structure the tasks and fields of national youth 
policy. Focus on youth is needed in different dimensions of social and public policies: 
education, childcare, health, employment, culture, social inclusion, etc. Structural 
organization of youth involvement includes all of these dimensions and is aimed finally 
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at building and developing a civil society. Several of them are considered essentially 
important in all youth national policies: education and lifelong learning, health and 
mental health, combating youth unemployment.  
The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Education and Culture 
(DG EAC) handles youth policy related issues and supervises ‘Erasmus Plus 
Programme” (which since 2014 follows “Youth in Action Programme”). Out of this 
programme, many local and international youth projects are being financed not only in 
the EU states, but also in other neighboring countries. There is no doubt that the EU is 
widely involved in advancing youth policy in the states in many fields (Williamson 
2002, 30-31).  
However recently, more researchers and, moreover, documents of COE, witness 
that youth dimension of the EU is called ‘youth policy’ (Williamson 2002; Helve et al. 
2011; Hornstein 2008; Siurala; Wallace et al. 2011). I suppose there are several 
arguments for it. I also suppose that the results of empirical research will reveal some 
more argumentation (for or against it). Nevertheless, now framing European youth 
dimension relies on so-called Open Method of Coordination. The latter meaning that 
targets and actions are set by European policy makers in forms of recommendations to 
the domestic youth policies. Then participating states (which are both the EU member 
states and non-members like, in my case, Norway) voluntarily report about 
implementation of the European models. The OMC adds value to youth policy 
researches, as it is one of only few where this method plays a leading role. Besides, the 
OMC (i.e. annual reports by states to the EU, and “Youth in Action Programme” 
evaluations) is becoming a wider and stronger mechanism of Europeanization. There are 
complex youth policy reviews made by European teams of scholars and voluntarily 




1.1.3. Youth, integration and globalization 
 
 Recent youth studies intend to take into account the latest problems and realities 
of social and economic environment. In the globalized world the market plays the 
central role and is a regulating instance in society (Bendit 2008). Interdependence of 
economies, various social interactions and exchanges create one highly competitive 
world where individuals feel unconfident facing these changes. Many scholars note that 
the market requires deeper educational and training background but offers less 
opportunities for employment (Olofsson and Wadensjo 2012). It causes changes in 
transitions of young people to work. The model of the past – a linear one – was 
relatively predictable. Education was a kind of guarantee that a young person will have 
a job upon graduation. The linear way supposed as well a transparent government 
strategy and allowed at every stage offering a required government action. 
In the modern world, this is less and less predictable. Transitions become more 
differentiated and even unique for a young person. Getting education does not mean that 
on the market a person will be competitive enough to get a desired gob. Education 
period is prolonged and obtaining an adult status requires more time, and often supposes 
a partial achieving when a young person remains partially dependent from the others. 
Usually it means dependent materially, including also so-called “protracted home 
stayers”. Probably young people themselves cannot maintain those high standards of 
living, which a family provides for them. Independence and emancipation do not 
frequently occur as they used to – outside the family. Instead, emancipation within the 
family is a new trend of modern developed countries (Bendit, 2008, p. 34). The negative 
effect of it appears in incapability of young people for autonomy, and in further 
prolongation of their “youth” status.  
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Changing patterns and concepts of youth claim an updated social and youth 
policy. If earlier in the past youth policy used to be concentrated at local level, then now 
it moves from local to the EU and then European level (and probably further to the 
global). I can suggest the opposite influence: the one of global and European / the EU 
levels on the national states. This two-directional nature of Europeanization should not 
be ignored; and existing researches more often focus on tracing it.  
 
1.2. Youth in Nordic Welfare states 
 
The Nordic countries are on the one hand a part of Europe and some of them 
also a part of the European Union. On the other hand, they are often taken as a unity due 
to language similarities, cultural heritage and social values. Such concepts as “the 
Scandinavian welfare states” and “the Nordic model” may be repeatedly seen in 
publications and studies (Hummeluhr, N. 1997; Kidal N., Kuhlne S. 2002; Olofsson J., 
Wadensjö E. 2012). The similarities also exist in youth policy (social inclusion, youth 
guarantees and key focuses). The relevance of youth research in the context of European 
youth dimension, and the features common for the region (and making this region) 
explain my interest towards the topic. 
Similarity of the objectives of youth policy in Nordic Countries is a consequence 
of their common features as welfare states. There are active gender studies of Nordic 
youth researchers as a consequence of growing employment among women in Nordic 
countries in 1960s; many researches were made within a Birmingham school (which 
included feminists, post-modern, constructivists’ studies, etc.) (Helve et al. 2011, 52). A 
Nordic Model of youth research is characterized as a separate formal youth research 
structure. Starting with the first Nordic Youth Research Symposium in 1987 Nordic 
Youth Research Institute (NYRI) set a range of networking actions financed by the 
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Nordic Council of Ministers. It has also connections with the EU and COE youth 
researches. The present framework was established in 1992, and since that time 
researches were particularly focused on different spheres and invited scholars from 
many countries (thus, for example, research on living conditions of young people in the 
Nordic periphery (2001) involved scholars from Russia and Baltic States) (ibid., 64).   
There is a well-known repeated cliché that “young people are a resource and not 
a problem” (Williamson 2002, 17). As it is marked by some studies, for Nordic 
countries young generation is a resource rather than a problem. It is a significant “factor 
of social modernization and economic progress” (Bendit 2008, 36). Investment in youth 
policy creates opportunities for the whole society to improve the social and economic 
environment. According to the EU standard of youth policy development, states are to 
find “policy gaps” – shortfalls and weaknesses – and design their policy to cope with 
these gaps (Siurala, n.d.). Whether best practices offered within European integration 
can be (or are) applied by Nordic Countries is a question which I expect to answer in 
my Master Thesis. 
One of other differences between the general European youth situation and the 
Nordic one falls into relevance of youth unemployment. In Nordic countries, comparing 
with many other European ones, the percentage of young people involved in extensive 
education and further successfully entering the labor market is high. The proportion of 
inactive among 15-24 years old is low, which means a low percentage of young people 
outside the education system and labor market (Olofsson and Wadensjö2012, 3). In 
relation to that, is combating unemployment a key focus of the youth policy in the 
Nordic states?  
Characterizing welfare states Nanna Kidahl and Stein Kuhnle speak about 
universalism as a main principle of welfare policy. This principle (whether it is good or 
bad) provides relatively equal social guarantees for every citizen (or resident in some 
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countries). The authors still name unemployment on the agenda of Nordic States, 
however they describe a trend towards active measures to reduce it, “negative sanctions 
rather than incentives, duties rather than rights” (2002, 25). These countries are 
traditionally considered as “work societies”; stricter qualifying conditions for sickness 
insurance, disability, unemployment insurance, single parents’ support demonstrate this 
“work approach”. The following quote of Lawrence Mead regarding Western welfare 
policies reflects their main trend: “… the needy should receive aid, but only in return for 
some contribution to the society.” (ibid., 27).  
Meanwhile a concept of a youth guarantee is an important element of Nordic 
countries’ youth policy and it creates a basis for further progress (Hummeluhr, N. 1997, 
7). They include guarantees of access to secondary and high education, decreasing an 
unemployment period, guidance of young people not participating in training programs. 
One of the findings of the fight with unemployment was a distinction between the 
groups of young people and different kinds of guarantees for them. For teenagers the 
accent is made on education and training, whereas for young people in their 20s “the 
most important is to prevent an exclusion from the labor market or an early 
marginalization” (ibid., 25). 
Universalistic principles provided a universalistic youth policy regime. Wallace 
and Bendit in their article “Trends towards Europeanization of Policy” define three 
principles of classification, which can be applied to create a typology of youth policies. 
These principles are philosophies of intervention, target groups and the organization of 
the youth sector as a part of a social policy (Wallace C., Bendit R. 2011, 149).   The first 
– philosophy of intervention – refers to mentioned earlier dichotomy “youth as a 
problem vs. youth as a resource”. The Nordic Countries are the example of the latter 
and often are taken as a role model at this point. However there are still aims common 
for both Nordic and southern European states. Promotion of youth autonomy as one of 
14 
 
the major ones also unites the Nordic states into one group. Relative independence of 
young people there is achieved due to welfare state support. Phenomenon of 
independence within the family is particularly common for the south then, where age of 
achieving autonomy is higher.  Among the other common aims is integration of youth 
and political and social participation (which is higher for Nordic countries but still is a 
key focus as to turn youth into active citizens). Here for Nordic states there can be 
added a question of the youth phase extension as welfare model of the north transfers 
family support and guarantees of education and training into sphere of state 
responsibility (ibid., 150). 
The second principle – targeting youth – has already been discussed above. A 
narrower frame for defining youth age groups is applied. Finally, according to C. 
Wallace and R. Bendit, the typology is based on whether a state has major or minor 
youth sector (p. 152). Here Nordic countries are reported to have a minor sector 
(dispersed as well among educational sector, employment and social ones). In Sweden, 
Norway and Finland, one ministry is responsible for youth policy. Iceland, with no 
special youth center and has no youth directorate, stands apart from the general picture.   
The universalistic model of youth policy is distinguished from the other existing 
ones. In the table (Figure 2.2.) one can check the criteria of such statement. In the 
universalistic model, rights and benefits are distributed to all young people and are 
effective welfare state support. One of the features of this model is strong state directed 








As literature review witnesses, youth policy is a new and relevant topic. It is 
contradictory that there is no youth policy at European level: some scholars and 
documents nowadays call European youth dimension “youth policy”; but it relies on the 
OMC and thus is advisory with high share of voluntary actions of the states. The OMC, 
however, is helping more tight connection of European and domestic choices, wider 
introduction of practices. The last chapter of my thesis will help to argue to what extent 
European recommendations on youth policies are the ‘European youth policy’. 
Conceptualizing ‘youth’ is so far heterogeneous. Probably it is due to high 
degree of domestic independency. It is one of aspects where Nordic states differ from 
the European thinking. In general, the Nordic states can perform as one unity with a 
common ‘welfare states’ label. Existing particular studies of the Nordic states compare 
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models and policies within this unity of countries. At the same time, close cooperation 
between the European states (and especially – EU-Members) in terms of policies, 
actions and programs, and the common strategies of future development make Nordic 
countries a part of a bigger unity.  
Existing studies report that the countries practice similar models of youth policy 
and face similar problems. Literature review shows that, although relatively new, many 
European youth studies report about unemployment, problems of youth transitions in 
the modern world and general overview of ‘youth policy’ of the EU and COE. The 
Nordic Countries themselves were the object of various researches including the ones 
about welfare state feature, particular practices, economical and historical retrospection 
of the region statement. It means that Europeanization of the youth policy (and such 
cases as Finland and Norway) offer rich and almost untouched research field. 
In conclusion of their research C. Wallace and R. Bendit resume that 
“…European youth policy remains unspecific and ineffectual” (Wallace and Bendit 
2011, 158). This should serve a stimulus for future research in order to enrich the 
knowledge and change the situation. This year the new initiative has been launched to 
follow up a previously existing one called “Youth in Action”. The new “Erasmus Plus 
Programme” is supposed to improve the “ineffectual” gaps of its predecessor and 
continue the positive actions. Remarkable that one of the new actions, which appeared 
in the Programme, is aimed at involving business to participate in the youth policy (i.e. 
giving it the right to apply for EU grants for youth projects). Is it a sign of growing 




2. What Europeanization studies can contribute to the 
International Relations 
 
As this thesis is concerned with the influence of European integration on the 
youth policies of Finland and Norway, it is theoretically framed with the help of 
scholarly literature on Europeanization. Featherstone and Radaelli in the Preface to their 
volume wrote about “the fashionable nature of this term” meaning, of course, the term 
“Europeanization” (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). In the same volume, the editors 
present tendencies of articles devoted to this topic: while in the early 1980s from 1 to 3 
articles were devoted to the topic, by 2001 this number increased significantly (ibid, 5).  
Indeed, recent European studies more and more often mention Europeanization, try to 
conceptualize it and find its useful applications (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009; 
Boerzel and Risse 2003; Olsen 2002). However many of these very scholars also 
mention low awareness of research design, lack of focus on variables and too much 
attention to mechanisms. Is there any difference between European Studies and 
Europeanization? Why the “fashionable” trend becomes as such? In this chapter, I will 
try to give an overview of Europeanization studies, different approaches to them, main 
trends in research design, and explicate applicability of Europeanization studies to my 
research. 
 
2.1. General trends of Europeanization studies  
 
Evolution of European Studies shows soft transition from questions of how 
European integration is working to how it affects national policies. This is the core 
feature of Europeanization studies, which focuses on the domestic changes caused (or 
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supposedly caused) by European integration processes. “Europeanization can be 
characterized as different forms of diffusion processes of European ideas and practices 
across time and space” (Flockhart 2010, 788). In fact, there are quite many attempts to 
define this phenomenon (Olsen 2002), and from constructivists view “Europeanization 
is ‘what political actors make of it’” (Radaelli and Pasquier 2015). In this research I will 
apply Radaelli’s justification of Europeanization’s utility for IR researches: 
‘Europeanization provides a theoretical lens on the effects of integration on domestic 
political structures’ (Radaelli 2006, 58). I must admit, that Radaelli speaks about more 
EU-centric Europeanization: “…the rules, procedures and policy paradigms are deﬁned 
in the making of EU decisions and only afterwards incorporated into domestic 
discourses, identities and political structures” (Flockhart 2010, 789).  
Most of researches in the field of Europeanization strive to understand its nature 
and outcomes, as well as impact on domestic politics and policies (Boerzel and Risse 
2003; Olsen 2002; Radaelli 2003; Exadaktylos 2009). There are also studies of 
Europeanization effects in new EU member and candidate states (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Sedelmeier 2006). It broadens the field of theorizing and forms a new 
branch of research. Focus of Europeanization is on social learning processes, adaptation 
and lesson-drawing (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) The latter statement 
advocates the choice of cases of my research – whereas Finland is a member state of the 
EU, Norway is only a co-operative neighbor and voluntary participant of European 
policies.  
As I have said above, the conceptualization of Europeanization is broad and 
covers wide range of phenomena. Olsen names five applications of the term, which 
depend on the focus of changes they cause. They are changes of external boundaries 
(often related to expansion of the EU), development of European institutions (with 
connection to collective actions, co-ordination), central penetration of national 
19 
 
governance (witnessed by division of powers and adapting national governance), export 
of forms of political organization (and this one covers relations with non-European 
countries) and a political unification project  (Olsen 2002, 923–24). The latter one – a 
political unification project – is best applicable to my thesis. It represents not only a top-
down perspective, but also leaves way to study how national states influence on 
European politics and policies.  
Another useful typology of Europeanization is connected to the 
institutionalization of politics. Europeanization is defined as “the emergence and 
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse-Kappen 2001, 3). This idea focuses on cross-level interactions, i.e. 
Europeanization here takes place at European, national and global levels. There might 
be possible interpretations, however. I believe it is relevant for the research that both 
within-EU and EU-non-member states interactions are taken into consideration. This is 
also two-dimensional approach and allows downside-up perspective.  
There can be other different approaches to Europeanization: researches of 
‘cause-of-effects’ and ‘effects-of-causes’ (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009, 507), 
different notion of temporality, etc. 
At the same time, youth policies do not belong to urgent European and national 
agendas. I cannot ignore the fact that this a very ‘liberal’ topic where national states are 
only advised to follow the recommendations of the EU. Despite the fact that in youth 
studies researches speak about “European Youth Policy” (for example, Siurala; Wallace 
C., Bendit R. 2011), there is still no coherent policy at the European level (and 
illustrates this comparison to CFSP or Environmental policy). One may then question 
the topicality of this research. Nevertheless, I state that tracing Europeanization in the 
field of youth is an extremely interesting example of ‘soft’ domestic changes. When the 
national states are not obliged to adapt their policies, but only advised, it will let me see 
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how Europeanization appears to them. Do the states voluntarily follow the 
recommendations? Are there signs of Europeanization at all? What are the interests of 
states when they co-operate in this field? 
These questions explain why among different conceptualizations of 
Europeanization I stayed at those allowing two dimensions of process. The object of the 
research (youth policy) required consideration of its framework. Like widespread 
practice, my research examines ‘the goodness of fit’ (i.e. degree of institutional 
compatibility) between European, national and sub-national processes and institutions 
(Radaelli 2003, 40). Then, in order to understand the outcomes and institutional 
changes, it is useful to apply the notion of ‘goodness of fit’ (Boerzel and Risse 2003). It 
combines the following two ideas: The first one seems to reflect constructivist ideas. 
Study of internalizing domestic norms and states’ commitment to the EU institutions 
(even identity fit); it touches upon how active the actors are, who sets the norms, how 
the political environment is at particular time. Second, referred to as rationalist 
institutionalism, is the study of opportunities that actors get within institutions, how the 
power and resources are distributed (Boerzel and Risse 2003, 58). In addition, I would 
like to stress that Europeanization here is different from “EU-ization” (which is only an 
important part of a broader phenomenon) (Flockhart 2010, 790). In methodological and 
conceptual aspect, Europeanization is about constitutive rules to create common space, 
and EU-ization – about regulative rules inside society. In other words, I will differ 
common rhetoric and behavior (Europeanization) and particular changes of structures, 
rules and norms (EU-ization focus).   
Interest of my research is, consequently, in two dimensions of changes. One is 
how youth dimension is conceptualized: it focuses on the growing common vision and 
purposes of youth policy, and changing identities of youth. The other one is in the 
evolution of the political organization of policies: how co-operative action capacity 
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develops, what are its financial and institutional resources and governance, who are its 
actors (ibid., 788).  
 
2.2. Adaptational pressure in youth policy and outcomes  
 
Which policies are always on the agenda notwithstanding whether it shall be 
European or national level? Defense and Security, Economics, External and Military, 
Environmental... Of course, the order can be different, and probably it is quite 
subjective. However, youth policy never gets into the top-list. I have mentioned in the 
previous paragraph that it is a very rare, and thus interesting, case of Europeanization in 
the ‘liberal’ field of youth. This requires paying more attention towards adaptational 
pressure it creates.  
The impact of European policies can be noticed through the soft mechanisms. 
Youth strategy of the EU, for example, does not itself create an adaptational pressure. It 
rather sets a general model that can be adapted by states partly or completely. At the 
same time, it prepares basis for further shifts in domestic policies.  
Adaptational pressure takes into account the level of misfit between domestic 
and European institutional settings. The bigger the gap is, the more adaptational 
pressure a state feels. This is a part of ‘goodness of fit’ notion, which considers cases 
when there is a European model ready for implementation by the states. Youth policy is 
a way to trace how the European models are transmitted into domestic ones in case 
when there is a very low adaptational pressure. 
Radaelli analyzes existing studies and presents a general map of probable 
outcomes (Radaelli 2003, 37–38). Europeanization, he claims, can flow into inertia in 
cases when the EU directives lay too far from the domestic practices. Signs of this 
outcome are delays and lags of domestic changes, resistance to EU-offered choices. A 
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different outcome is absorption. It is merely an adaptation which save a state’s native 
policy ‘core’ but shows flexibility states. It is accommodation of policy without 
fundamental re-structuration. The latter one, as it shows, differs from transformation. 
Transformation leads to paradigmatic changes, new conceptual thinking of an actor. 
Finally, the most curious effect of Europeanization is retrenchment. This is an opposite 
effect, when European norms turned a state into a less ‘European’ one. Which policy 
outcomes appear in this research is still a question, and I will try to answer it further. 
 
2.3. Mechanisms of Europeanization 
 
I have already argued that the youth dimension of European politics has its 
relevant features. There is thus a particular mechanism of Europeanization typical for 
this research object. I will again apply to Radaelli’s arguments. He finds two types of 
mechanisms: vertical and horizontal (2003, 41). At vertical level, adaptational pressure 
descends European norms to the national level and further. In opposite, at horizontal 
level, the domestic choices are whether to follow or not European choices. This includes 
framing states’ policies to newly conceptualized best practices and models. On the 
scheme (Figure 1.3.) Radaelli illustrates various mechanisms of Europeanization in 
relation to public policies, including vertical and horizontal typology. 
As it is demonstrated, when there are European models, there is adaptational 
pressure. It means that if there is a European model of youth policy, states will feel 
pressure to adapt their national policies to it. At the same time, there might not be such a 
pressure, and thus there should be other reasons for the states to change youth policies 
according to the EU choices. In case when there is no model, domestic choices are taken 
often without correspondence or account of the European ones.  
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In case of youth policy, it seems that the third – framing mechanisms – is the most 
attractive. The Open Method of Coordination is one of the major instruments of 
European youth strategy. In the last chapter, I will come back to this typology. It is 

















Figure 1.3. Mechanisms of Europeanization (Radaelli 2003, 41) 
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While Europeanization is a fashionable term, it is also a way to theorize domestic 
outcomes of European integration. There is a growing number of researches and studies, 
each trying to test applicability of Europeanization studies. Literature review witnesses 
Europeanization researches not only within member states, but also including candidate 
and neighboring ones. Although most studies focus on the EU impacts (and it can be a 
limitation of theorizing), Europeanization is wider, not only within the EU. It proves 
relevance of two chosen cases and broadens opportunities of researchers. Distinction 
between Europeanization and EU-ization helps to approach two interesting matters. The 
first one is conceptualization of youth (how much European youth agenda is similar to 
domestic ones), this is Europeanization level, and in my analysis, I refer on documents 
of COE (as a different from the EU institution with 47 members). The second one is 
institutional, normative and political changes; it is a narrower empirical focus on the EU 
actions.  
The diversity of approaches, which exist in the literature, I believe, is an 
advantage. It allows choosing the best one. I will refer on a political unification project, 
which helps my interests towards institutional and other domestic changes, and towards 
new conceptual thinking of states.  
I supposed in this chapter, that there is either a low or none adaptational pressure 
in relation to youth policy. It draws me to alternative Europeanization mechanisms. One 
of them that catches attention is framing mechanism and its outcomes. The further 
chapter will add more to understanding the methodology that I used and lead to the 




3. Youth Policy Tracing 
 
In the XXI century, trends in methodology have changed. Nowadays 
“combining the different approaches at different stages of research offers the best 
prospect for improving our understanding of international politics” (Sprinz and 
Wolinsky 2004, 26). Popularity of descriptive methods is decreasing whereas 
quantitative ones are still on the surge. At the same time, the nature of social science 
often limits researcher with empirical data. Ideas of combining methods and solving 
new research tasks have become more and more popular (Kloz and Prakash 2008) 
Though quantitative and statistical methods are nowadays still relevant, and advantages 
of statistical methods are not underappreciated, qualitative methods are being developed 
in combination with others or as such.  
In frames of this research, qualitative methods help me reveal how 
Europeanization appears to the states, and how national youth policies develop close to 
the EU. In this chapter, I will describe the methodological approach to the matter.  
 
3.1. Case selection 
 
The hypothesis of this research brings us to study of contemporary youth policy 
making in the Nordic states. I have chosen case study method due to its more empirical 
and reality-bended nature (King 1994; George 2005; Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004). It 
compensates limitations of statistics in terms of identifying omitted variables through 
examining intervening ones in individual cases, and thus uncovers new causal 
mechanisms. Interesting is that case study is different from statistics where 
completeness of any given case is not strictly required; statistics relies on probabilistic 
associations. Case study is a way of explaining historical chains with high levels of 
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construct validity, and making generalizations of two and more variables (George 2005, 
21).  
Reading methodology literature, one may think that case study is the most 
popular method for international relations researches. However, case study method itself 
is rather a frame for several ways of within case analysis. Advantages of case studies 
include their ability to accommodate complex causal relations. Otherwise, conducting 
the case study, I can process qualitative data massifs and find complex causal relations 
between dependent, independent and intervening variables (George 2005, 22). 
As any other research method, case study should rely on theory. Without 
theoretical frame, main questions cannot be answered: which cases are selected and 
why, why they are representative and independent, how they are comparable. This 
research is aimed at uncovering the relations between the EU youth policy and national 
youth policies, otherwise it test theories of Europeanization. It explains why this 
research follows the logic of confirmation (unlike the logic of discovery which allows 
find new hypothesis) (Sprinz and Wolinsky 2004, 253). 
Case selection is explained by the nature of cases. They are intentionally taken 
similar between themselves (Nordic identity as basic feature) and contrast in relation to 
the EU. In this research Finnish and Norwegian youth policies serve as cases of the EU 
– Member state – Non-Member state relations in the field of youth policy. I hypothesize 
that there may be probable outcomes of this research: a) policy-taking (Finland and 
Norway mainly adopt their youth policies to the youth strategy of the EU); b) policy-
making (Finland and Norway mainly integrate their youth policy practices to the EU 
youth strategy and benchmark their best practices); c) mediocre (Finland and Norway 
combine the above two types, but both countries act more or less in the same “stream” 
within European youth agenda); d) unique way (Finland and Norway build their youth 
policy in different ways and these ways depend on (non)membership in the EU). The 
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last proposition adds to the answer why exactly these two cases are taken. I would like 
to dedicate some more words to that point. 
 
3.1.1. Nature of the cases  
 
The background of this research and hypothesis refers to the Nordic states. It is 
puzzling how one policy/strategy (in my research –European youth dimension and the 
EU youth strategy) can be realized by the member states, especially so different in 
internal social care mechanisms. The Nordic welfare states are considered almost the 
most successful in social guarantees, and many problems that are actual for Southern 
Europe are not that urgent for the Nordic states. There can be a concern that when the 
European standards are set in a way that all member states are able to meet the 
minimum requirements, the wealthier ones may feel encouraged to “freeze”, or even 
reduce, their standards and stay in line. A higher level of social guarantees and 
protection is allowed but is not required. It seems that European standards are aimed to 
set all member states equally developed, whereas this optimal level is lower than in 
some of the member states. It raises a question of how Europeanization is appreciated – 
as a positive or negative trend. And in that circumstances, what is the influence of it on 
the national youth policies?  
Otherwise there are the following variables: European youth dimension and the 
EU youth strategy, and national youth policies (two cases). Identifying types of 
variables for this case study was not a simple question. At the starting point, the 
hypothesis claims that national youth policies of the Nordic states are dependent 
variables, and the European level is an independent one (Bennett and George 1997). 
However when I have written about the hypothesized outcomes, there are possible cases 
when these variable are vice versa. Similarly, there can be intervening variables (such as 
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national identity and European identity, for example), that was discussed in 
Europeanization literature in nuances.  
In the case of Finland and its youth policy, Finland is a member state of the EU, 
and thus does feel the influence of the Europeanization and particularly EU-ization. The 
second case is Norway. Though it is not an EU member state, Norway is a member of 
COE and takes part in sharing its best practices of youth policy through Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC). It participates in strategy implementation and EU youth 
programs. The latter three evidences, besides the Nordic identity, unite these cases and 
create an interest towards them as to both Nordic states representatives and independent 
cases of Euroepan-domestic relations.  
 
3.2. How to conduct a within-case analysis 
 
Once the cases are chosen, it is time to understand which empirical evidences, 
data and presuppositions we have. Distinction of nature of qualitative and quantitative 
data leads to different methodological approaches them. This research of 
Europeanization uses qualitative data. Primary sources are official reports, acts, laws 
and youth strategy documents. I analyze them in order to answer my research questions. 
Secondary sources add more points of view on the object; they are other scholars’ 
studies and researches, reviews, acts of other policies, etc. 
In order to conduct a within-case analysis one may find extremely useful process 
tracing as the main method within method. Process tracing is one of fundamental tools 
of qualitative research. It is a way to look deeply in the case uncovering not only causal 
mechanisms, but also their sequence and results at stages. This method is defined as 
“systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011, 823).  
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Process tracing can do both – test and generate theories (Bennett and George 
1997). Moreover, it can test either theories or causal mechanisms, where latter is the 
third application of process tracing. If the method reveals a systematic mechanism, then 
it can be brought to similar cases. Researcher can also make inferences about presence 
or absence of such mechanisms. 
The use of process tracing method for current research adds uncovering the 
stimuli of youth policy actors, tracing the connections between decision process and its 
effects, as well as describing the actual point of state. For me it is essential to 
understand how national youth policy decisions are influenced by European models and 
the EU youth strategy. Advantage of the process tracing is in the description of cases 
sensitive to the order of events. It “provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts 
for mechanism-based accounts of social change” (Checkel 2008, 115).  
In the beginning of this research, I planned to use process tracing as the main 
method of within-case analysis. Further, I found out that, in its turn, it allows combining 
different tools. Process tracing draws our attention to description and narrative. 
Narrative lies in the beginning of the case study, and the next paragraph explains how 
political narratives are analyzed in this research.  
 
3.3. Usability of analytic narratives  
 
In this chapter, I have mentioned several times narratives as one of the tools, and 
I believe that my cases can be interpreted with the help of “analytic narratives” (Sprinz 
and Wolinsky 2004, 255). Barbara Czarniawska brings an example of Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s philosophy: that social life is a narrative (Czarniawska 2004, 3). Following 
the tradition of hermeneutics, narrative analysis is a way to detach among huge massifs 
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of texts the major terms, trace how the discourse (and the reality) is being created. 
Narratives, in other words, help to structure the reality (Clandinin et al. 2007).  
Narrative is defined by Levi as  “the story being told but as a detailed and 
textured account of context and process, with concern for both sequence and 
temporality” (Levi 2002, 5). The two notions – of sequence and temporality – are 
important for process tracing within cases. This tool of process tracing finds out which 
inferences exist between variables at time and certain political environment.  
In my thesis, narratives are interpreted from constructivist point of view. 
Czarniawska relates such approach with the reader-response theory. (Czarniawska 2004, 
68). The stories (imploted narratives) create a reality to fit these stories. What matters is 
how an author interprets the reality, and whether a reader believes this interpretation or 
not. It does not take the world as a collection of subjectively told stories. In every 
narrative the author is not unique. Positioning in conversation defines whether it is 
accepted or modified, or rejected by the other participants of conversation. This 
postmodernists’ idea seems especially interesting if the task includes, as in this thesis, 
analysis of reports about actions and strategies. The language and terminology, the 
forms of speech and features of the narrative reveal the most topical zones. An example 
of such constructivism in narration can be perception of youth as a problem or as a 
resource. Depending on the chosen position, the whole youth policy is built in a 
different way.  
One of important dimensions of the narratives is the audience (Eco 1995, 
Andrews et al 2013, 6). Narratives are produced for someone to percept them. I would 
like to underline this phrase, because in the third part of this thesis I analyze the Youth 
Policy Reports of Finland and Norway for the EU. The narratives of those reports, I 
believe, represent how important the recipient of the narrative is. Similarly, when the 
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EU calls for the national youth reports, the narrated by states reality is structured in 
correspondence with the supposed recipient. 
Narratives from constructivists’ point of view are the constructs of discourse. 
This case study of the youth policy can hold three discourses in one – the European one 
(including the EU level), the Finnish one and the Norwegian one. I do not conduct 
discourse analysis in this research, however narratives that I construct for each case lean 
on empirical data and primary sources.  
After statement about the nature of narrative in my research, I would like to 
explicate the stages of narrative analysis. I will apply to Czarniawska (2004) typology 
of narrative analysis: structuralist, post-structuralist and dramatist. The typology I take 
lies between post-structuralist and dramatist approaches. Post-structuralist analysis 
allows avoiding typical roles and structures. Instead, I find it more useful to define 
authors and readers of narratives, and their unique roles in each case. From dramatist 
approach comes again importance of temporality and political environment. Used a tool 
of process-tracing, narrative analysis for me essentially has to take these two categories 
into consideration. Such combined approach to narrative analysis helps me to 
contextualize facts and steps of the process, and at the same time connects theory and 
methods with the reality. 
I believe it is necessary to indicate that narratives always include intentions of 
the reader, intentions of the author, and intentions of the text (time and environment). 
Notably that not only individuals use narratives-stories to interpret and reflect the 
reality. Youth policies and strategies can be conducted by groups, institutions and 
nations. They interpret political and social environment and agenda. Interpretations in 
forms of narratives affect perceptions of the others. Since Europeanization can be also 
viewed as representation of political reality, narratives are tools both for European 
integration bodies (to affect and distribute European values, policies, etc.), for the 
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Member States (f.i. when lobbying their interests) and for non-Member States (who 
have to deal both with national states, the EU with its organizations, COE). All these 
actors make narratives, and percept the narratives of each other. The negotiations 
between them result in diverse levels and degrees of interpretation (or analysis), with 
the best solution to keep a balance between over-interpretation and basic semantic level. 
It is essential to notice that the text is a written work of discourse, which endows it with 
particular characteristics such as being distanced and linear. These characteristics allow 
research the written texts by methods not applicable to speech (Eco 1995).  
 Together with classical interpretations, I will try to follow constructivists’ logic 
too. The question ‘what does a text say?’ is now in pair with ‘how does a text say it?’. 
Analysis sources draws attention to the terminology and key concepts. I believe it also 
brings surprising results and ground for further research (the basic example speaks for 
itself: the EU Member states and Non-Member ones conceptualize “the youth” 
differently – starting from the age frames, and finishing with governmental institutes 
responsible for youth affairs). 
 As I argue above, political narrative analysis is a tool for process tracing. 
Narratives serve for two purposes of this research. On the one hand, the primary sources 
are narratives that I analyze. On the other hand, narratives are the form to represent the 
results of my primary sources analysis. They describe how particular youth policies and 
strategies are structured. I will try to trace Europeanization with the help of political 
narrative analysis. The term “political narratives” here means that the analysis is based 
on particular primary sources – officially produced by the EU institutions and COE, or 
by national states with relation to the youth policy. In other words, for each of the cases 
there are its narratives. As well as for Europe there are also particular narratives of the 
youth agenda. How different (or how similar) these narratives are? This question will be 




3.4. Limitations of the methodology 
 
Applying a certain methodology, I cannot ignore its limitations. The first one is 
about the direction of Europeanization and defining variables. Consciously I have to 
limit the research and take the two cases as dependent variables, whereas European 
youth dimension and the EU youth strategy is an independent one. In other words, there 
is only one direction of Europeanization in my focus. Probably, the wider setting of 
Europeanization should be taken as a topic of future research. Here it is worth to say, 
that there would also be a potential of applying process tracing – it helps uncovering 
feedback loops (Beach 2011). The latter is when changes in dependent variable at a 
particular point in time result in changes of independent variable, and later it affects the 
dependent variable again. Such feedback loops are inevitable in political science and 
international relations. I can expect that the same happen with my variables. The 
European youth dimension requires certain changes from the national youth policies, 
which then report their practices and adaptations in order to change the initial European 
strategy itself. 
Another limitation comes from the chosen within-case analysis method. Process 
tracing reveals a complex of causal relations for each case. Causality is often connected 
with inability of researcher to exclude all but one explanation. To measure causal 
weight of phenomena is a big task. If the same result is reached by different means, then 
what are the causes? I hope that narrative is the way to minimize equifinality due to 
sequence of relevant for the case events (Bates et al. 1998). Another essential element 
for adequate causal inferences is background knowledge. Process tracing helps me to 
build a theoretical explanation from empirical evidence of the cases. Small number of 
cases is justified if a researcher is theoretically informed about the “environment” of the 
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cases. The same importance refers to heuristics and the way one treats the evidence. 
Researcher can make assumptions and interpretations, which are strong if exclude 
coincidence. Sufficient attention this research draws to uncovering “silent zones”. When 
the narrative comparison shows what kind of causal relations exist between the EU and 
national youth policies, then I can theorize when actions or policies of the EU are silent 
(i.e. do not cause changes or reactions) for the youth policies of Finland and Norway, 
and vice versa. These theorized inferences can be further extrapolated on the other cases 
and tested. 
 Finally, there is a limitation of narrative analysis. The narratives do not 
represent the absolute “truth” or reality as such. In this research, they are conceptualized 
as a tool used by both their creators, and those whom they are presented. One possible 
way to deal with such subjectivity is to compare multiple narratives. Another – to mark 
out that from constructivists prospective it matters more whether narratives in national 







The research question requires a reality-bended methodology with ability to test 
hypothesis and conduct analysis of politics. In order to provide it, I have chosen case 
study as the best way to look deeply into the matter. Case study helps to answer a 
research question and offers the logics and tools to the research. The methodology 
includes process tracing as a method of within-case analysis. Its advantages, firstly, help 
reveal causal inferences and, secondly, test whether there is an interconnection between 
the cases and the EU actions. Narrative analysis is a major tool of process tracing. It 
makes possible to work with field material and variety of data. I believe that such 
combination of methods helps compensate possible limitations. The case study is 
justified from the points of case selection, representativeness, defining variables and 
tools. This methodology is to produce sequence patterns, narrated and described based 
on empirical data. The next chapter represents the process and results of methodology 
and theory application to the primary sources. It finally provides with an answer to the 




4. Europeanization of Youth Policy in Nordic States 
 
In the first chapter, I advocated the utility of Europeanization as a theoretical 
lens, which uncovers domestic effects of European integration. Scholars offer different 
applications of Europeanization, and in many approaches, it is a two-directional process. 
This research focuses only on the top-down direction – from the European level towards 
the national youth policy. This assumption is determined by the volume of this research, 
and by the chosen methodology. I believe that downside-up direction is definitely not 
least important; however, it is a ground for continuation of this research in future.  
Thus, with Europeanization as a framework, I focus on the national states as 
the objects, and youth policy evolution as a subject. This chapter puts together the 
development of the EU youth strategy with the development of Finnish and Norwegian 
youth policies at the same period. European processes, key choices and cognitive 
models will serve me a “role model” of European youth field. Nevertheless, my task is 
to answer the question: how Europeanization appears in each case, whether it changes 
the way in which ‘youth’ is defined in national contexts and enables domestic political 
and institutional changes. I also expect to come up with choice of particular mechanism 
of Europeanization available in my cases and add to argumentation about the 
reasonability of the term “European Youth Policy”. 
I will examine the cases with the help of process tracing and analytical 
narratives. Comparing narratives embedded in certain political environment, I hope to 
find causal mechanisms that draw domestic changes.  
Results of my analysis consists of two parts. The first one represents several 
core narratives reconstructed from the European youth dimension, and these are 
followed by the national ones. Each narrative has a time scale attached to it, so that a 
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reader can trace the consequences of changes. The second part consists of my 
evaluations after the analysis within theoretical framework of this research. 
 
4.1. Collecting primary sources  
 
Primary sources for this empirical analysis are official documents, the EU 
youth-related documents and the countries’ official reports on their youth policy, and 
policy reviews by the COE. The sources can be roughly divided into three groups: the 
ones about the European youth dimension, and apparently, the ones about the Finnish 
and Norwegian youth policies. The European level documents are taken from the 
official web pages:  
Official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu) 
Access to the European Law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) 
European Commission: Youth (http://ec.europa.eu/youth) 
European Commission: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency 
(EACEA) (http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth) 
Council of Europe (http://coe.int)  
Official country reports on youth policy (which are part of OMC and Youth in 
Action appraisal) are also available from the indicated resources. 
In Finland youth related issues are part of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture control, thus, the main documents are available at its web page 
(http://www.minedu.fi). Youth Guarantee (http://www.nuorisotakuu.fi) is another 
resource for monitoring changes in youth work of the country.  
Data about Norwegian youth policy is performed at the European Commission 
web page (in Country Youth Reports) and at the official country web page ‘Mission to 
EU’ (http://www.eu-norway.org/). In the documents found at these two sources there 
38 
 
are references to the official web pages of Ministries, legislation acts and 
communications, however most of them are not translated into English and either will 
be used in this analysis in their brief English versions included in youth reports, or will 
not be referred to if English translation is not available. 
Finally, some data was found at the Global Evidence-Base for Youth Policy 
(http://www.youthpolicy.org).  
 
4.2. Changing boundaries: does the European youth think it is European? 
 
The first narrative is about the concept of youth and its needs. I start on the 
European level, as it functions as an independent variable. The narrative has been 
constructed by me with the help of primary sources: “European Commission White 
Paper. A New Impetus for European Youth.” 2001; “Follow-up to the White Paper on a 
New Impetus for European Youth: Evaluation of Activities Conducted in the 
Framework of European Cooperation in the Youth Field [COM (2004) 694]”; 
“European Youth Pact.” 2005; “European Parliament Resolution of 18 May 2010 on 
‘An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering’ (2009/2159(INI)).”; “EU 
Youth Report. Results of the First Cycle of the Open Method of Coordination in the 
Youth Field (2010-2012)”.  
 
2001                         2004      2005                  2009                               2012        
 
Figure 3.1. Revisions of the youth agenda in the EU 
 
Once upon a time the European Union appeared. It was young and inhabited 
by serious economists and politicians; it lived among European States. The Union was 
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growing, and soon children and adults started wondering where the states borders were 
disappearing. They looked for the borders: in the North and in the South, on the earth 
and in deep waters, looked in cabinets and institutions, papers and numbers. 
Nevertheless, they saw that all traditional borders were melting; and only people could 
create the new ones. Finally, people though: “the EU must take shape with the people 
of Europe”. They decided to teach young generation of 15-25 years old with this 
wisdom: democracy, closer links between peoples, and participation of all. It was hard, 
because relations grew complex, and gap between generations enlarged. Europe needed 
citizens, and the youth needed motivation to participate in public affairs at all levels, 
better learn about the Union and its European neighbors, trust its work and have more 
autonomy. Almost five years passed, young people grew up, and the Union saw that the 
youth was very vulnerable: it learnt to be Europeans, but it lacked skills and training to 
achieve prosperous European future. Then the Union decided to help the youth get 
better work, live in society and family, study and learn. Many other policies decided to 
join, and help the youth, too. Europe did not forget about teaching young people how to 
live together in diversity and cooperate.  
Suddenly economic crisis hit Europe; it was scary and damaging. The Union 
was brave and defeated itself, and many dimensions of the Union offered their support 
to Economy (who was the main hero that time). The youth was offered to study and train 
abroad; Europe decided to invest in it and modernize youth work. Especially needed 
help those with fewer opportunities. To sum it up, when the European youth has good 
jobs and mobility, education is modernized, young people with fewer opportunities are 
socially included, Europe will become sustainable and welfare.  
 
 This European level narrative demonstrates a visible evolution of priorities. 
European integration here is very EU-centric in the beginning (although youth 
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dimension first appeared in European discourse in 70s. Starting point here – “the EU 
must take shape with the people of Europe” (“European Commission White Paper. A 
New Impetus for European Youth” 2001) – became the key message of the first 
complex document in this field. It explained why objectives covered a wide range of 
issues: from co-operation of the states to prevention of “citizenship deficit”. I believe it 
was an experimental period, when youth mobility, voluntary service and other areas 
were recognized at the EU level. Consequently, transparency and access to information 
were also on the list. Then focus was drawn to youth training and education. The 
European Youth Pact of 2005 openly speaks about a “better coherence across all policy 
areas that concern young people”. Of course, in 2009 the crisis and economic challenges 
enhanced a “youth as a resource” conceptualization. More such terms as ‘investment’, 
‘smart’, ‘sustainable’ appeared in the youth discourse. Combating youth unemployment 
for many European states became a key task. Interestingly, at that time only the 
representatives of Slovakia and Czech Republic in the Barroso Commission were from 
youth-related sectors. 
 I found a different story in Finnish materials. Analysis and the construction of 
the narrative was based on youth policy documents: “Youth Work Act 235/1995 
(Amendments up to 663/2002)”; "Youth work in Finland" 2004; “Finland Youth Policy 
Decree.” 2006; “Child and Youth Participation in Finland” 2011; “Youth Act 72/2006”.  
 
(1995)        2002   2003          2005     2006    2008                                    2011                   
 
Figure 3.2. Revisions of the youth agenda in Finland 
 
In the year 1995, Finland joined the European Union. It was an important and 
responsible step, both for the authorities and for citizens. It was a year for revision of 
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the Youth Act, too. The Finnish youth needed better living conditions and inspiration for 
civic activities. Finland also wanted them to learn ‘equality between generations, 
genders and Finnish regions, tolerance and cultural diversity and to ensure sustainable 
exploitation of nature’. Seven years passed, and some of youth workers decided to ask 
Finnish young people about their wellbeing. It appeared that social status, 
entrepreneurship and political engagement were not important for the majority of 
young people. Who were those young people? Little kids, children and young people 
under 29 years old. Almost one third of the Finnish population! There were just few 
immigrants, and the population was dispersed in that Nordic country. Meanwhile youth 
unemployment reduced almost three times, young people wanted not just careers, but 
self-expression. They wanted more diverse education and training.  
In 2005 another ten years passed since the last Youth Act, and Finland had to 
update the document. It though what the youth needed, and created youth policy. It had 
to provide young people’s growth and better living conditions. No young person was to 
be excluded from any sphere of society and policy. Even children – as a child’s rights 
were very important. Youth (children and teenagers, and people under 29 years old) 
had opportunities to participate more.  
Time passed, there was a crisis in Europe, and also in Finland, but the youth 
still had support. It was sad that with such dispersed population still many young people 
did not get more than basic education. School satisfaction rate was one of the lowest in 
Europe. What will be the measures of future youth work? Participation, non-
discrimination and life management – these are the needs of the youth and objectives of 
youth policy makers nowadays. 
 
The final narrative in this paragraph comes from the Norwegian youth agenda. 
The following documents led the analysis and narrative reconstruction (noticeably, three 
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of them dated earlier than the European youth dimension is defined; however they are 
still relevant and hardly significantly reviewed): “The Children Act” 1981; “The Child 
Welfare Act” 1992; “Education Act” 2000; “Government’s Report to the Stoerting No. 
39” 2001; “The Child Welfare White Paper (Report No. 40)” 2001; ”Youth Policy in 
Norway”2004; “Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway.” 2008; “Country Sheet on 
Youth Policy in Norway.” 2012.  
(1981, 1992, 1994 
2000)    2001             2004            2006      2008     2009                   
 
Figure 3.3. Revisions of the youth agenda in Norway 
 
In the North of Europe there lived the prosperous and co-operative 
Norwegians. They cared about their children: taught parents to complete their duties 
and functions towards children under 18 years old, provided secure environment for 
children and young people with all essential services, provided education. When 
children reached 18, measures for them could change, but young persons received 
social guarantees until they were 23 years old. What children needed was ‘safe and 
meaningful everyday life’, and advancement of the rights of children. There was 
another important objective – to involve children, young people and their parents in the 
non-governmental sector (because many citizens lived in far regions and NGOs could 
report about local needs).  
When COE offered youth policy review, Norway decided to invite foreign 
experts. It asked them to check whether children and young people participated at local 
and national level in activities; how effective criminal justice was; life of immigrant 
communities. Finally, Norwegians thought that integration of different policies was 
essential to evaluate. When the experts came, they received a ‘cold’ welcome. Autonomy 
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and welfare state tradition, decentralization of policies, and weather, too, played their 
role. Nevertheless, the country was thankful for the work of experts. It thought that for 
young people (especially for those with fewer opportunities) in Norway would be useful 
to know and participate in European programmes: strengthen civil engagement, 
international understanding and solidarity, European co-operation.  
To sum up, Norway is very inclusive society. Any deviation is a problem, 
including youth margins.  
 
4.2.1. Evaluation of the youth agenda analysis 
 
The three narratives reconstructed from policy documents witness several 
parallels in the youth agendas, as well as core differences in the conceptualization of 
‘the youth’, objectives of youth policy and consequent action choices.  
First thing, which I noticed immediately, is that ‘the youth’ is defined 
differently. Let me give a very simple fact: the age of ‘the youth’ in every country of 
Europe can be different. In Italy, for example, a person of 34 years old belongs to the 
youth, whereas in Norway it is always ‘children and young people’ who are in the 
center of youth policy (in some sense united with childcare). Following the analyzed 
documents, at European level from the very beginning the youth was defined as 15-29 
years old people. Finland has taken a way of changes: in the beginning, there was not a 
clear border between a baby, a child and a youngster in policies; on the contrary, at the 
moment, the Finnish definition of who “the youth” is corresponds with the European 
one. Interesting, that in Finnish case there are more references on the EU as particular 
level of European integration; accordingly, more references at the EU youth strategy.   
The story of Norway is very different: it still pays more attention to childcare. I 
believe that the expert team’s evaluation of Norway is fare: “…youth in Norway is 
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firmly conceptualised as a bridge between childhood and adulthood. […] [T]here is a 
particular understanding in Norway of young people as a resource, which is especially 
strong” (Wolf et al. 2004, 19). In Norwegian documents, on the contrary, there are more 
references on European integration without specifying whether it is the EU, COE or 
others. Moreover, Norway explicitly mentions European dimension of youth and state’s 
active support of these debates and policies at European level.   
Then come the relevant objectives of the youth policies (Figure 3.4.). I have 
bolded those objectives in Finnish and Norwegian cases, which are close to the 
European ones for particular time. In order to make as rigorous an interpretation as 
possible, I examined the texts in terms of their openly stated ‘purposes’, ‘objectives’, 
‘priorities’. Results of their comparison is interesting. Whereas in Europe, youth 
employment seems to keep its ‘top-list’ positions, it hardly has the same importance for 
the two Nordic states. Youth wellbeing and environment are mentioned by both Finland 
and Norway. It includes, probably, employment, too, but not so explicitly. Instead, the 
two Nordic states keep traditional priorities and, unavoidably, add new ones. Social 
involvement and participation, training and education seem to be quite common. Also in 
both cases, children’s rights are mentioned. There are typical national priorities like 
criminal justice and health in Norway (very unusual for the other states in context of 
youth policy).  
When I analyze narratives within time, I see a tendency towards more 
“correspondence” between the European and domestic policies. Again, in the case of 
European youth strategy co-operation appeared among the priorities. Similarly, Norway 
defines national priority in European cooperation. It explains, I think, Norway’s 
participation in all programmes.  
To sum up, the youth policy agendas of Norway and Finland seem to be very 
similar in the beginning, perhaps due to a common Nordic identity and the welfare state 
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background, but then, in the middle of the research period, Finland turned more toward 
the EU choices. The economic crisis does not seem to change domestic youth policies 
significantly (unlike at European level); there is no great shifts in priorities, no new 
strategies and actions appeared. The period of 2008-2010 seems to be witnessing the 
biggest gap between youth policy priorities of European youth dimension and the 
domestic ones in my cases. Nevertheless, approaching to the year 2014, the differences 
decrease. A kind of agreement in agendas emerges.  
 
4.3. Instruments of youth policy change  
 
I chose to focus the second narrative on ‘actions’. It is based on the stories of 
how actors plan to develop youth strategy / policy, which decisions they make, which 
mechanisms and institutions involve. This paragraph will include three stories, as the 
previous one; each story is accompanied with time line with the key dates when 
documents containing plan of actions appeared. Before passing to my cases, I start with 
story about the EU youth dimension.  
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Time periods EU Finland Norway 
Before 2001 n/a in this research Living conditions, 
equality, tolerance, 
civic activities 




2001 - 2005 Participation, 
information, voluntary 
activities, a greater 
understanding and 
knowledge of youth, 
access to information 











NGOs’ work to 
cover local level, 
criminal justice and 






and family policies 




























Children’s rights  N/a 
2011 – 2014 Youth employment, 
social inclusion 
(particularly for those 
young people with 
fewer opportunities), 






















2002         2004                   2007                           2010                       2013    2014 
 
Figure 3.5. Accepting youth ‘action plans’ in the EU 
 
Once, when the European youth dimension had just appeared, someone asked: 
“How can the European Union tell its ideas to other countries? What if countries have 
better ideas and will not need ours?” The Union went thinking. The European Identity 
was very young, and there was a need to study youth agendas in different states better 
in order to understand who were European young people. Then the Open Method of 
Coordination was offered. Voluntarily, many states started to share their best practices 
and communicate. The Union thought again, and invented better information exchange. 
It also invited other policies through which to communicate about their youth policy 
ideas. Nevertheless, again, it was not enough; not all states participated, and few best 
practices were adopted. “Maybe I could add financial support for states?” – The Union 
thought, and started various youth programmes. The EU continued telling states about 
the actions and financial opportunities they could have. Meanwhile, the EU monitored 
domestic youth policy changes.  
When, after crisis, the Strategy Europe 2020 appeared, youth dimension also 
got attention. The Union decided to invest in the youth and included it in its 
programmes. The European youth could use more grans for learning, training and 
studying.  At that time, more countries every year wanted to submit their national youth 
policy reports. The COE even offered to send its scholars to review domestic youth 
policy; and a few states agreed and financed the researches. In their turn, researchers 
offered recommendations for how to improve states’ youth policies. No need to say, that 
more knowledge about the youth in Europe was accumulated. The Union had Youth 
Strategy; COE helped to form a collection of the best practices, and finally decided to 
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unite all youth programmes into a big one. They left and expanded opportunities for 
grants and support for Member States; narrowed, but still left actions where non-
member states could apply; and even invited socially responsible business. Then, the 
youth had more learning mobility, and states – more co-operation.  
 
This narrative actually discusses instruments of the European level. They are 
the Open Method of Coordination with two directions of information flow; organizing 
youth information access for states; and financial support through the EU youth 
programmes.  
The way the OMC operates in the youth dimension changes within time; it 
becomes more complex, with several parallel information flows. By that, I mean four 
basic types of youth policy communications: 
 ‘the EU to all states’ direction (which presents common European Youth 
strategies, programmes’ priorities and actions),  
 ‘volunteering states to the EU’ direction (states submitting annually 
youth policy reports),  
 ‘states to the EU research teams to the EU’ direction (meaning complex 
youth policy reviews which are offered by the EU, financed by states, and also used by 
the Union),  
 ‘the EU to particular states’ (recommendations of the EU research teams 
to participating states). 
The second instrument that I found is organizing information access for the 
states. It might be a part of the OMC communications, but it is also a part of general 
information environment of the EU. It includes Internet resources, financing 
conferences and non-governmental sector, involvement of other policies. The third 
instrument that I determined is financial stimulation. Those actions, which are the 
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priority of the EU, are supported by grants (basically) through youth programmes: 
academic (“Leonardo”, “Erasmus”, etc.), sportive, educational and training (“Youth in 
Action” (2007-2013)), providing experience (“Youth on the Move” (2010)), finally, 
uniting the majority of them, “Erasmus Plus Programme” (2014-2020).  
 Further, I move to the Finnish youth policy.  
 
(1995, 1997)  2002      2004     2006    2008                       2011                   
 
Figure 3.6. Accepting youth ‘action plans’ in Finland 
 
In the Nordic lands, there was a state of Finland. Its citizens lived in big cities 
and tiny villages; they inherited different Nordic ethnicities and lived in a close 
neighborhood with the other Nordic states. Local authorities, provinces and 
municipalities had much autonomy and cared about their children and youth. Regularly 
the government asked at local levels, consulted with NGOs, and renewed its Youth Work 
Act. In it, Government assigned funds to support youth work. In addition, to know better 
what their youth wanted, people started asking young Finns about their needs and 
concerns. At that time, there was no ministry or institution responsible for the youth 
policy, maybe there was not even youth policy as a term. 
Finland was a good welfare state, but it also was a member of the EU and 
European state. When the EU asked, Finland among the first agreed to tell about its 
achievements in youth work to the other states and financed (among the very few) a 
Finnish youth policy review by COE. At the same time, it developed work on children’s 
rights, hosted a UN conference. Cooperation with the European Union became 
stronger, Finland started taking part in the European programmes, submitted annually 
reports to the Union where told about European youth dimension. Finland was thankful 
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for recommendations, and it tried to follow European advice in youth policy. Thus, it 
worked out the social guarantee measures for youth employment. Traditional 
decentralization and autonomy stayed, but “Youth Policy” appeared officially (right as 
the Union advised) and Ministry of Education became responsible for it. It coordinated 
efforts of other ministries and introduced democratic mechanisms into youth work at 
local levels. 
 
Before making evaluations about causality and dependency of Finnish youth 
policy on the European one, I would like to introduce the third narrative of the 
Norwegian case. 
(1981, 1992, 1994, 
2000)     2001                 2004          2006          2008     2009                   
 
Figure 3.7. Accepting youth ‘action plans’ in Norway 
 
In the Nordic lands, there was the Kingdom of Norway. Its citizens lived in big 
cities and tiny villages in severe environment. Nearby, in the similar environment, there 
lived their neighbors from the other Nordic states. Children especially needed 
protection and care, so the Kingdom controlled their parents, developed children’s 
rights, cared about children’s health and development at governmental and local levels. 
People in the Kingdom lived well, and it was important that no deviations appeared. To 
that end, Legislation Acts were passed and followed. Government cared about children 
from their birth until they became adults. Besides, as people lived through the large 
territory, the Kingdom asked NGOs to help and provide children and youth policy at the 
local level. Nevertheless, there were still problems! 
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When Europeans started talking about the youth in 1972, Norway immediately 
became a partner, contributor and driving force. In 2001, Norway thought about 
domestic changes of child welfare system. “Maybe we should let the state, for example, 
‘taking over responsibility for institutional provision and the 27 local teams to work 
across municipalities’”, - thought the Kingdom. Problems required solutions, deviations 
threatened to people’s and Kingdom’s welfare. To check the new action plans, Norway 
decided to listen to recommendation of European experts and invited them. Finally, 
action plans and strategies were launched, and they applied to working life and public 
services. Children and youth had long been one of priorities for Norway. For them 
there was infrastructure, protection and support. They also needed to know about 
European programmes, and Norway launched information portals and platforms about 
youth opportunities. Especially to build ‘universal design’ for youth with fewer 
opportunities, Norway supported 68% of the operating costs of ‘Youth in Action 
Programme’. A responsible ministry appeared for youth, and youth policy was still 
supported by governmental funds. 
 
4.3.1. Evaluation about changes of institutions and politics  
 
During the analysis, I understood that the period of my research is quite short. 
On this time scale, there is an average one-year delay and consequence between 
European actions and domestic reaction (Figure 3.8). I will try to explicate it and prove 
whether the European actions serve as causal mechanisms, or whether there are other 
intervening variables that cause most domestic changes.  
The OMC defined the character of relations between states within European 
youth dimension. Both Finland and Norway voluntarily participate, submit reports, and 
finance youth policy reviews. As European researchers themselves say, among 46 (that 
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time) member states of COE there were few countries that “consider policy on children 
and youth a priority for the whole government” (Wolf et al. 2004, 5). It is true, that 
initially child and youth policy is important in both analyzed cases. This can be a feature 
of the Nordic welfare state model, characterized by a high degree of universalism, thus, 
considering deviations a problem, and trying to prevent margins since early age.  
At the same time, there is a different vision of European youth dimension and 
state’s role in it. In Finland, there is a consideration of the EU choices (such as 
introducing social guarantees in accordance to the EU priority of combating youth 
unemployment). There seems to be a dependence between the EU Youth Pact, Finnish 
Youth Policy Development Programme 2007-2011 and Finnish revision of its Youth 
Act. The latter changed the terminology (“youth policy”, for example, appeared as a 
term). There is a direct reference to the European Youth Strategy in the Child and Youth 
Policy Programme in Finland for 2012–2015. 
Norway associates its actions to the European advice more modestly, and less 
refers to the EU particularly. There is rather a sense of an opposite direction – that 
Norway introduces more actively its own practices to the European level including the 
EU. The fact that since 1972, when the youth field has just appeared in European 
discourse, Norway was a partner of initiatives and discussions, leader of ideas. One of 
the examples of Norway’s practices adopted at the EU level is the institute of Child 
Ombudsman.  There is an almost simultaneous reaction of Norway on the European 
White Paper on youth in 2001. Two significant reports to Stoerting (Norwegian 
parliament) raised children and youth questions and were followed by new action plans. 
In the rest of the analyzed Norwegian documents, I have not met direct or partially 
explicit references to the EU actions, except the national priorities of the EU youth 
programmes (“Youth in Action”). There is another thing that makes me state that 
Europeanization has another domestic effect on Norway: “Norway should reduce 
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protection and prevention over the young people, so that they can build capacities 
themselves” – this is a conclusion of COE youth policy review for Norway. It witnesses 
a highly positive youth policy situation (especially comparing with the other COE and 
EU member states!). It must be even too positive, if the recommendation is to reduce 
efforts in youth policy. It proofs for me, that Norway’s role should be a leading one 
regarding youth policy. At the same time I ask myself, whether Finland is so different. It 
seems it is not. Then the fact that in Finland there are much more illustrations of youth 
policy changes closely after European acts or strategies appeared, witnesses the EU-
ization phenomenon.  At the same time, there no such signs for Norway. It participated 
in ‘Youth in Action’ and many other European programmes. However, it defined 
national priorities of such participation as: better information of youth about 
opportunities, quality of training (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway.” 2008), 
“inclusion of young people with fewer opportunities who are: youth with disabilities, 
school “drop-outs” and unemployed youth, youth at risk because of drug abuse, 
psychological problems, socio-economic deprivation, and youth with a minority 
background” (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway.” 2012).  These are priorities, 
which are very typical for universalistic models. The EU initiatives then complete 




European Union Finland Norway 
(2001-2002) Open Method of 
Coordination: states’ annual reports 
and states youth policy reviews 
2002 UN meeting of youth 
experts and researches in 
Finland 
Government’s report to the Storting No. 
39  
The child welfare white paper (Report No. 
40 (2001-02) 
(2003) n/a Performance agreements for 
provincial youth services 
Project of cross-sectorial youth 
policy development and youth 
Ombudsman 
Action Plans for child and youth policy 
(2004) Youth Portal (information 
about European youth programmes) 
Report about Youth Work in 
Finland within OMC 
The Finnish Youth Research 
Network took part in an EU 
youth research project 
A council of Europe Policy review 
(2005) European Youth Pact n/a n/a 
(2006) n/a Finland Youth Act (‘Youth 
Policy’ officially appeared), 
Youth Policy Decree, Youth 
Policy Development 
Programme 
New bodies established to provide youth 
policy 
(2007) ‘Youth in Action Programme 
started, finance of actions that: 
1.Promote active citizenship  
2.Develop solidarity, tolerance and 
social cohesion  
3.Enhance quality of support 
4.Promote European Cooperation 
1 project financed by 
European Youth Foundation 
(EYF) 
n/a 
(2008) n/a UN Youth Conference in 
Finland 
2 projects financed by EYF 
Youth Policy Report within OMC 
1 project financed by EYF 
(2009) Youth Dimension in “Treaty 
of Lisbon.” (Articles 165, 32) 
European Youth Strategy 
2 projects financed by EYF Norwegian Eurodesk (web resource that 
operates in Norway information service 
about European youth policy) 
Action Plan to Promote Equality and 
Prevent Ethnic Discrimination 2009-2012 
(2010) ‘Youth on the Move’ 
Programme started 
A council of Europe Policy 
review (Child and youth 
participation) 
4 projects financed by EYF 
Action Plan for Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality 
2 projects financed by EYF 
(2011) n/a Child and Youth Policy 
Programme for 2012-2015 
3 projects financed by EYF 
Focusing on Children and Youth: The 
Government’s goals and focus areas in 
state budget for 2011 
(2012-2013) Evaluation of ‘Youth in 
Action’ through OMC 
Social Guarantee Measures 
implemented 
2 projects financed by EYF in 
2012 
Nordic conference on NEET Youth 
(Ungdom utenfor) in Oslo, October 11-12, 
2012 
Youth Policy Report within OMC 
(2014) ‘Erasmus Plus Programme’ 
(‘Erasmus for All’) started, finance 
of actions for: 
1) individual mobility and   
2) modernizing the education sector 
 
All actions available Actions available for Norway: 
Mobility: EVS, Youth Exchanges, 
Mobility for Youth Workers 
Partnerships: Strategic Partnerships, 
Transnational Youth Initiatives 
Policy: Meetings between young 
people and decision-makers. 
Figure 3.8. Mechanisms and instruments of youth strategy / policy  
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It is remarkable, that Norway financed 68% of the operating costs for “Youth 
in Action Programme”. I would rather explain it again by the fact that such common 
programmes become a good instrument not only to complete domestic youth policy 
tasks, but also to develop co-operation with other states within Europe and outside it.  
Both Finland and Norway supported the development of information exchange 
about opportunities of youth programmes. The Finnish Youth Research Network took 
part in an EU youth research project the same year when Youth Portal was launched in 
Europe. Norway, in its turn, created its own web resource, where it defined the EU’s 
and national priorities of youth work. In addition, both countries have co-operation in 
youth field with other actors. There is a strong cooperation within Nordic Youth 
Committee, where youth research takes great role. Then both states mention a priority 
cooperation with other adjacent areas: Russia, Estonia, the Baltic Sea Countries and 
Barents region. This line stayed within the Nordic Dimension of the EU, too. The aims 
of the EU youth strategy there are similar: cross-sectorial cooperation for the youth 




In the first chapter to this research, I hypothesized that the Europeanization of 
youth policy happens through framing mechanisms, and convergence around policy 
paradigms is reached via the OMC. The results of my analysis, nevertheless, witness a 
convergence in ‘tools’ and rather divergence in ‘contents’.  
Europeanization as a theoretical framework allowed me to approach domestic 
policy changes in two states caused, as I supposed, by the process of European 
integration. I also stated applicability of distinction between Europeanization and EU-
ization. Europeanization focuses more on new conceptual thinking, sharing and 
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communication. EU-ization is a part of it; however, it is a narrower focus on 
instruments, policymaking and institutional impact. The European youth dimension was 
treated as an independent variable, and the two cases (Finnish and Norwegian youth 
policies) as dependent ones. For purposes of manageability, I reduced the analysis to 
only one direction – top-down. However, in the process of data processing there were 
proofs of relevant downside-up effects as well. This is only mentioned here, and such 
phenomena offer a stimulus for future work in this field.  
Based on empirical material I defined two narratives: conceptualization of 
‘youth’ and its needs, and instruments of youth policy change. I constructed each 
narrative for European level first, then for each of the two cases. Time and “scene” 
became important dimensions of narratives. This link to dates and sequences as well as 
to major changes in the environment (like economic crisis) helped to include 
intervening variables into analysis.  
The first narrative comparison showed core differences in the 
conceptualization of “the youth”. At European level, it is a person aged 15-30, in 
Finland – from 0 to 30, in Norway – from 0 to 18 and 18-23. There is a strong tradition 
of connecting children and youth in Nordic states, then, the youth policy for these cases 
means a wider range of actions (legislation and criminal justice, childcare, health, 
school education, etc.), which are also parts of domestic youth policy priorities. It is also 
worth saying, that Finland has changed its “youth” age frames (probably for the 
purposes of operational ability within the EU initiatives). Norway still refers on more 
traditional “youth” age, and often - on “children and young people” rhetoric. In the 
“youth” definition, thus, Europeanization (or EU-ization) is visible in case of Finland 
more. 
Speaking about the objectives, youth unemployment became a leitmotif of 
European youth strategy, especially after the crisis. Two Nordic states do not pay it that 
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much attention. Their rhetoric is more education-oriented, although it is almost about 
the same matters (training and education, experience, mobility). Instead, for Finland and 
Norway concept of youth environment and children environment has an important role. 
They support European initiatives and take active part not exclusively because the EU 
recommended practices and actions are required at domestic level. Rather, it is 
European and international co-operation, and additional financial support for prioritized 
youth with fewer opportunities. 
Looking at the ‘content’ of youth dimension, I can evaluate different 
objectives, ‘key needs’ of youth at European level and Nordic states. Let me now make 
some inferences about ‘forms’ of youth policy making. I have written that both Norway 
and Finland take part in the European youth field and EU initiatives. Why is it, if 
understanding of ‘youth’ and its needs are not alike? 
For the EU relations with other states in youth field are defined by the OMC. 
This is the EU instrument for communication, sharing, control and introducing domestic 
changes. Finland and Norway participate even more than majority of other states, 
including financial support of youth policy researches. But there are unclear 
expectations of these states from the OMC. Finland, apparently, tries to implement 
changes recommended by the EU, even if there might be different prioritizing. It refers 
to the EU choices in domestic documents, adopts new terminology. Norway leaves an 
impression of prosperous state where youth leaves ‘too great’. It seems not paying much 
attention to the EU advice. Instead, tries to solve domestic youth problems, but supports 
significantly European programmes explicating for them its national focuses.  
What is my conclusion? The examined two cases belong to the welfare, 
historical models, which presumably has an influence on youth policy thinking as well. 
There is a mixture of Nordic identity, European identity and European Union identity 
(which I would like to set different from the preceding one). There are traditions of 
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childcare, which ‘welcome’ a youngest citizen and brings a child up trying to avoid any 
marginalization (in family, at school, at social life, etc.). Youth is a state of transition 
from child to adult; the youth is a resource for wellbeing of country. Of course, with 
such a background, the Nordic states look more advanced in youth work than average 
European countries. Their priorities in youth policy are different from the European 
general choices, and it is fare. I would argue that in both cases upside-down 
Europeanization is very natural. Best practices, already working in analyzed states, can 
be useful to the other actors (although not always applicable). Moreover, the analysis of 
instruments proved such cases.  
Despite the two cases are similar, they witness there is a difference between 
Europeanization and EU-ization. In case of Finland, there are more parallels with the 
EU youth strategy: from adopting terminology, naming a youth-responsible ministry up 
to several direct references on European priorities in domestic strategies. It lets me 
conclude that the EU membership creates ‘goodness of fit’ pressure for Finland, and it 
is less (or none) for Norway which is the EU non-member. There might be a state’s 
perception of rationality of the EU choices, growing European identity, foreseeing 
political benefits of co-operation, etc. In any case, the EU-ization process takes place 
within Europeanization and provokes domestic policy changes.  
These two cases are also interesting for the reason that one sees that the same 
EU instruments cause different reactions in states. This reaction in one case (Norway) is 
modest and makes me suppose more active state’s role in shaping European actions. In 
another case, that of Finland, Europeanization stimulates both a different conceptual 





Youth policy is not a new topic for European discourse. It appeared in 70s and 
existed as youth dimension in various political contexts. However, since 2001 it is 
gaining a certain relevance, especially within the “youth as a resource” rhetoric. 
Moreover, some scholars and documents nowadays call the European youth dimension 
a “youth policy”. It is not a policy as a formal European model with high adaptational 
pressure on states. It is still a “liberal” field of European interests, which relies on the 
OMC and thus is advisory with high share of voluntary actions of the states. The OMC, 
on the one hand, provides better understanding of domestic youth policies and 
strategies. On the other, it is a framing instrument, which, as I will discuss further, helps 
to introduce the EU choices into domestic youth policies. European youth dimension, 
with the help of OMC, various financially supported youth programs and youth 
researches, prepares ground for further integrated European youth policy. At the same 
time, it is closely connected with economic, demographic, political European agendas. I 
believe that effectiveness of European youth strategies and actions, primarily, considers 
positive changes in the most problematic areas. Meanwhile, states with more effective 
youth policy performing either should prioritize their domestic aims of European youth 
dimension, or be more active in influencing it with their best practices. If not, adaptation 
to standards of European youth policy may cause less effective domestic policy. 
The areas of European youth dimension that I discuss include the concept of 
“youth” and the most relevant European youth needs. The Nordic states, traditionally 
viewed as welfare, universalistic states, define “the youth” as a part of childcare agenda. 
The age, social status, and apparently, the needs of youth differed from the European 
ones. Europeanization creates certain common interests and perceptions, and such aims 
of domestic youth policies as European cooperation and information exchange, youth 
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mobility, youth education and training are now included in states’ youth work. 
European integration and globalization, too, affect the environment of young people and 
add new challenges. In this light, the European youth strategies and EU youth 
programmes are reflections of those new needs of young people in such context. 
However, the context is still different within states; there is a different background, 
models. It is natural that domestic youth policies had different focuses, and probably, 
different institutions.  
Existing youth studies witness that the Nordic countries themselves were the 
objects of various researches including the ones about welfare state feature, particular 
practices, economical and historical retrospection of the region statement. It means that 
there is an interest towards Nordic model, including the youth policy. Probably, it is due 
to youth researchers’ opinion that “…European youth policy remains unspecific and 
ineffectual” (Wallace and Bendit 2011, 158). My research lets me say that youth policy 
priorities of European level and domestic ones of course cross at some points connected 
with European integration. But they are different in relation to what exactly the youth 
needs, and especially youth employment has different relevance for European and 
domestic levels. 
Europeanization framework is very popular nowadays among international 
relations studies. In its nature, it is a way to theorize domestic outcomes of European 
integration. Applicability of Europeanization studies varies, and among modern trends, 
there are researches of two dimensions of it – both top-down and downside-up. Besides, 
I applied the concept of “EU-ization”. It is done to show the difference between 
European level and its narrower focus – the EU level. Utility of such approach revealed 
when empirical evaluations were performed. In Finnish case, there are more evident 
causal mechanisms of youth policy changes after the EU recommendations. At the same 
time, Finnish youth policy nature was long time similar to that of Norway. Why then 
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one state changes its youth policy slightly, while the other one keeps more traditional 
domestic way? I believe that division of Europeanization (focused on identity shifts, 
common concepts, communication and best practices sharing) and EU-ization 
(normative, institutional, political changes) is fare in relation to my research. 
Thus, EU-ization creates “goodness of fit” notion, which has provoked changes in 
Finnish youth policy. Europeanization, on the contrary, does not make adaptational 
pressure and is rather “liberal”. In other words, framing mechanism of Europeanization 
is more valid for EU-ization. There is a convergence of policies is case of Finland, 
achieved through OMC, probably. In the case of Norway there is less convergence. 
Again, there are tools of the youth policy like EU youth programmes. These tools 
completely rely on European level’s image of European youth. In both my cases, states 
actively take part in those, Norway – as a non-EU-member state. In the case of Norway 
the priorities of participation seem very coherent and linked with domestic youth policy. 
To illustrate this, priority of participation of youth with fewer opportunities from 
Norway (it is a part of state’s determination to prevent any deviations and keep 
universalistic model of social care).  
Europeanisation effects, primarily, witness initiatives to share best practices, 
participate in OMC and offer policy review for European judgement. EU-ization effects 
are institutional changes (for example, identifying a ministry responsible for youth 
policy, defining that there is a national youth policy in Finland, social guarantee, taking 
over the youth policy tasks to local levels), as well as normative changes (terminology, 
age of “youth”) and other policy changes.  
My research revealed the presence of upside-down effects of Europeanization, 
particularly for Norway, but also for Finland. They are in participation in European 
youth dimension, researches, hosting conferences. At the same time, it is not possible 
now to evaluate whether states affect European youth strategies within both 
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Europeanization and EU-ization focus. It is a future researches task to take into account 
another direction of Europeanization and make certain inferences.  
The research questions I asked in the Introduction were “how European 
integration appears in the youth policy”, “are there causal relations between European 
and domestic policy changes?” and finally, “what are these causal relations for each of 
two cases?”. I believe that my research lets me now provide answers. Europeanization 
and EU-ization as its part are the framework of tracing European integration effects. 
These effects are different, though, for each case. Norway is more modest in changing 
its youth policy. Nevertheless, it is very cooperative in European youth dimension from 
the very beginning in 70s. I presume that in this case, top-down effects on domestic 
policy are few, but there is probably more activity in downside-up direction. Those 
changes of youth policy that I see in the analysis refer on a within-state changing 
agenda. Sometimes they correspond with the European ones, sometimes not. European 
youth strategy and programmes are complementary instruments for national youth 
policy priorities. European cooperation is an important issue for Norway. 
In Finland, Europeanization is in the form of EU-ization. The EU standards, 
norms and strategies are considered when domestic youth policy is implemented. There 
are causal relations of policy changes, and there is a top-down direction of 
Europeanization. Although OMC is a framing instrument, there might be an 
adaptational pressure and “goodness to fit” pressure.  
To conclude, I would like to add again that Finland and Norway have different 
experience of European integration. My research proved that for an effective and 
coherent European youth “policy” top-down Europeanization might be ineffective. 
When the gap between states’ policies is great, an “average” standard may encourage 
welfare states to reduce their efforts. In order this does not happen, there should be 
domestic priorities of youth policy, which take into account local and national 
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environment. These two cases witnessed that “European youth” is now an essential part 
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